Afghanistan, poppy and a heavy hand

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I read an article in the International Herald Tribune on the issue. Opium production in Afghanistan is at an all time high, and, unsurpsising, the US have called for steps to be undertaken to counter it - namely through spraying poppy fields with herbicides, a US favourite.

There are two points to discuss:
First - Does it work? Experience from Colombia suggests it doesn't.

Second - Is it sensible? It would be nice to deny the Afghan parties the respective revenues, and of course, to reduce the availability of heroin on the world market, but there are several substantial drawbacks:</font>

• Loss of focus - which should be on hunting a man by the name of Osama bin Laden
• Loss of support in Afghanistan (see below)
• Generation of additional resistance (as if the problems with the Taleban aren't enough), contributing to further destabilisation
• Loss of support with allies - at least the Brits are known to oppose it for the reasons a), b) and c)

That Kharzai now supports spraying gives testimony of US pressure on him. It was not his decision. Remarkable the comment was made not by him but a US official. Supporting it, will isolate Kharzai even more than he already is. When he will be accused to be a US stooge because of that, it will be correct, and persuasive.

When the article sais the villagers are not used to it, it leaves out that it means destroying the economical basis for the villagers. For them it is by far more lucrative to grow poppy, to sell it and buy food and commodities from the profit. That's a market driven process. It will be a boon for Taleban propaganda. Afghan allegations of chemical warefare are predictable, as are the inevitable inidents where the poison used will hit villagers. It is sure to make many people angry.
In Afghanistan (or Iraq) getting people angry means they are going to kill you for it, or if they can't get you, kill people of your extended family to get even. As it was an American decision that will mean US troops, NATO troops and any remotely western aid workers alike.

To add the issue of opium to the already difficult stabilisation effort in Afghanistan means stirring up the proverbial hornet's nest. If the US start to spray, that is a decision that will reduce support for the US and NATO in Afghanistan, making the task of stabilising the country, let alone hunting down Bin Laden, much more difficult than it already is. Not to mention straining the relations to their NATO allies. When the US go for it, the situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate. It's the wrong measure, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. In that order.

So if it's such a bad idea, why go for it?

Because the US *have* to be 'tough on drugs' as an extension of their domestic and Central American drug policy - their WoD meets the GWoT in Afghanistan - which both have probably irreconcilable neccessities and goals. A receipe for failure. The decision to not care and go ahead anyway is an ideological one. It may not work, but we do the right thing, that is, at least it feels right.

 

The US wanted to do it for about five years, but allied, primarily British, dissent kept them from doing it.

Iirc those mostly profiting from it are regional warlords allied with the Kharzai government. Today the opium street goes out north, not south where the Waziris are protecting Bin Laden and the Taleban leaders.

Stability, the hunt for Bin Laden and the re-emerging Taleban cannot be separated. Despite their differences, they both share the same base, and the way to read of the Koran. Stability can only be achieved by overcoming Taleban resistance, and that is probably only possible by making a deal, not by decisively defeating them. They aren't stupid enough to allow for that.

We both agree that poppy is undesirable and heroin is bad. Blaming the farmers is one thing. The other is that they do what they did for two or three centuries. We have now decided it's bad and fight it. The US and NATO are outsiders who impose rules on them. Nobody likes that. They will not share our view and fight back. If we want them to stop we got to offer them an alternative. Hoping that they will, if only duly punished, change their ways is unrealistic. The Pashtu tribes are quite bellicose people, with a very independent streak. You don't want to be on their bad side, it hurts. The Russians can tell you a thing or two about it.

So where are we? Poppy eradication measures will prove destabilising, making stabilisation as the primary task more difficult at the very least. So when that's your goal in this marathon, why glue weights to your legs? It's hard enough already.

 

The reason why opium production is so popular is because it is easy work, and several times more profitable than traditional farming.
The question is if we can do something about it that works. Spraying will be a thing the US will regret, and pay for dearly. Worse, it probably won't work.

And you are right on the legit part. When I portrayed poppy production as a tradition I wanted to point out how it will be spun by the warlords. The current production peak sais a thing or two about the people the US hired to fight the Taleban.

The Taleban opposed opium as un-islamic. The Taleban were able to impose their (very effective) ban on opium production on the people, without spraying. They used their islamic courts and draconic punishment, like public hangings, stoning and the like.

It seems the best way to get a thumb on poppy production is to re-empower the Taleban. However, re-empowering the Taleban is pretty much the last thing I expect the US and NATO to do, even though they might have no choice but in the long term.

Maybe that's the reason why the US see spraying as such a great idea. The silver bullet, no compromise and tackling the issue anyway. As a 'tech-fix' that's a very American solution I like to add.

 

Adding anti-drug measures now will result in muddled objectives. Stability has not yet been achieved. Now exterminating poppy cultivation is added.

By giving NATO and US forces an additional anti-drug role, the reasons for warfare in Afghanistan have already drifted. This translates into a constantly shifting landscape of military objectives, where current objectives recede in favor of replacements or additions before they can be reached.

The result is confusion, mission creep, and conflict escalation. That's what I meant with loss of focus.

Imagine yourself writing a program whichs specifications and requirements are constantly changed before you reached your milestones.

 

Still, as long as people have no other occupation to take, the program would be less than effective. If there were more successful crops in Afghanistan, the people probably wouldn't bother with the poppy for more than the internal market.

As it is now, they may destroy some of the crop, but people will grow more. Those who can not will only be impoverished further. Now, I don't know how it is in Afghanistan, but back home most of the people who grew it were pensioners and farmers who made something like $ 100 per month. If it's anything like that in Afghanistan, the people who grew poppy will have little other resort than paupery or banditry. I hope I'm wrong, of course, but I rather doubt it. I wish NATO, the US, EU, Japan and everyone else had instead taken a leaf out of the FDR book and invested a lot, and I mean lot, into projects that could keep the people of Afghanistan occupied - anything from roads to new agriculture to power plants and mines. This way the talibans could be remembered as the tyrants who brought the country back, instead of the people who subdued the bandits.

 

BTA,
I made a run through my link collection.

A great backgrounder is this article 'The fall and rise of the Taleban'. Confirming you, the author makes the point that while indeed the Taliban take revenues from heroin trade:

But there's a catch:

At the very least the guys the US conjoured up to fight the Taliban contributed to the current situation regarding opium: Victorious warlords set to open the opium floodgates. That leaves them in a silly position. In fighting opium trade, they'll probably have to fight both allies and enemies. Pissing off people by burning or spraying their opium will cause resentment. Where will they turn to when the US, NATO and the Kharzai gvt are against them?
Aside of alienating allies and neutrals, troops bound for poppy eradication will be missing elsewhere. It is realistic to assume a scenario like this: While troops burn a poppy field, the Taliban come and hang the pro-gvt mayor in the town nearby. Poppy eradication is already mission creep for the stability mission - which is modestly aimed on no-more-fighting for starters, not a perfect world under the rule of law.

A recent, and somewhat disheartening article: Taliban romp in the poppy fields:

Another very detailed backgrounder here: The ironies of Afghan opium production, which closes with:

I stand with my point that when the US starts to spray increased instability will be the result. Trying to stabilise Afghanistan, while en-passant eradicating poppy is over-ambitious.

 

BTA,
I hope we won't.

I haven't read the report yet, only excerpts. Thanks.

 

Perhaps we could take failing companies (Ford springs to mind), and using government subsidies, have them relocate much of their basic production facilities to the opium-producing regions of Afghanistan---and then pay the local workers good money (but still cheaper than American or Mexican labor). It could be handled legally as a government contract to Ford. The trick is to get the money to circulate---other projects would have to be subsidized as well.

In the end, it is a bet: if we support a basic economic structure in Afghanistan, will local ancillary economic development eventually grow beyond the benefits of opium production, and then eventually also be able to support itself without American-subsidized investment? Ehh...I doubt it.

Hey, we could always undercut the opium growers on the open market. I'm not saying Americans have to grow the stuff...but perhaps there is an impoverished nation out there somewhere whom are more friendly to us than the Taliban. We should let those people grow opium, and suppress Afghany growers. That way, we could let the drug addicts put the warlords out of business.

Just a thought...

 

There's a relevent portion from Packer's "Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of Insurgency" in this week's New Yorker in which an Aussie colonel on loan to the US says of the Taliban:

In other words, running around smacking down the poppy growers is a backwards approach, and plays into the hands of the insurgency. You don't punish people for doing what masked men with guns tell them unless you want to further push them into the sphere of influence of the masked men with guns.

 

Article on how the Taleban are financing themselves. Impressive.

 

Unsurprising, really. Cash transactions are bound to be the preferred method in the regions closest to Afghanistan (and in the country itself) and these happen to be the regions the Taliban can count on highest support. It's unfortunately normal that as the US and Western image suffers, popular and financial support for the Taliban and other jihadist movement would rise.

The best part about the entire mess is how sidelined Afghanistan became with the war in Iraq. The 20.000, if they are to be sent at all, should go there.