The Iraq Study Group - what is it, and what is it there for?

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There has been a lot of talk about the Iraq Study Group recently. I feel it is important to line out what it is and what it is not, and what it can accomplish and what it cannot.

For this I recommend this article by Mark Rothschild, the parts of which I can agree with uncommented I sum up below.

The ISG report does not offer the silver bullet for Iraq. Instead it has to be seen as an attempt to build a political consensus in Washington, on which to build policy that, unlike Bush's current policy, has broad support. That means, despite that the report deals primarily with Iraq, it's focus is domestic.

The reason why Bush refuses the ISG's findings, and why the neo-con fighting keyboarders are howling bloody murder over the ISG report, is that consensus policies threaten to water down their hard-line policy - like on Iran and Syria, support for Israeli hardliners etc.

So the opposition aganist it is in fact part of their power struggle at home. The fact that the presidents is with them in opposing the ISG report should be sobering. As long as the president calls the shots, the neo-cons are not down and out. They are fighting tooth and nail.

[ December 10, 2006, 19:44: Message edited by: Ragusa ]

 

IMO the current trends in US foreign policy and diplomacy may continue for a while, ISG or no. Newcomers - democrats, republicans, little green men from outer space - have to work in an atmosphere fear permeates the discourse and security issues and terrorism are chief issues throughout the board, and they will probably have to make a lot of compromises in order to appear strong. I guess it started with the aftermath of 9/11, but this legacy of fear may last quite a while.

And just out of curiosity, how many politicians in the USA would not support the Israeli government no matter what? I'm starting to even lose my frustration over that. In 1981 it took an air strike over nuclear reactors to bring a "shame on you" response, but now I doubt even that would make a difference. Good thing that in Tel Aviv have other problems. I just hope they haven't seen "Wag the Dog" recently.

[ December 10, 2006, 18:42: Message edited by: The Shaman ]

 

Perhaps, but there's good reason to oppose the ISG's main suggestion regardless. As the economist put it, the milestones and such are essentially saying: "do what we say or we're leaving, but we're leaving anyway".

That is to say, our principal means of persuading the Iraqi gov. and people to do what like is to threaten to pull out. But they'll know that most of our troops will be gone by '08 anyway. Not exactly a strong bargaining position.

Now, pretty much all the other recommendations (all, what, 79 of 'em?) are spot on. I've only skimmed the report, but it was solid. One of the more damning parts of it was section that read:

So much for restoring integrity to the White House, eh? It's like they did some sort of time-jumping-body-swapping thing and stuck McNamara's mind circa '65 in Rumsfeld.

You're quite right about a lot of the opposition being due to the 'omg we can't hate teh SyriaIranAxisofEvil' stuff.

 

Legitimacy is vital to successful policies. It doesn't seem like the Iraqi government or their buddies, the American democracy-builders, can back-up their words. But will inviting Syria and Iran to the table really lend credence to the will of the Iraqi government? Sure, they look like douches sitting next to us---but I don't think consorting with the worst of the neighborhood will necessarily certify the Iraqi house as part of the block. To my view, as an outside observer, the Iraqi government seeking legitimacy by associating with those whom have gained their own "legitimacy" by coupling religious fanatacism with blunt force is not a good sign. It sends a message...one intended for the population of Iraq...

...whom are the source of the vast majority of the violence anyway. Are the people detonating the bombs one and the same as the people advocating Syrian or Iranian stewardship? I'm not sure... Most likely the truth of the matter is quite hazy and convoluted.

But if that is so, and Syrian/Iranian involvement does indeed quell the violence, then bringing those guys to the table will, in the future, cement their position as powerbrokers within Iraqi domestic policy.

But worse yet, what if the advocates of Syria don't get along with the advocates of Iran? Is that what is occuring now? If that is the case, then perhaps official involvement by Syria and Iran is the only way to prevent full-scale warfare.

I think part of the problem is American isolation. We can't really talk to the individual ringleaders within Iraq, because that would certify their role as counter-influence to the government of Iraq. We can't really talk to the neighbors of Iraq because they are quite boogey-esque; in addition, once they are brought to the table they are never going to leave again.

Without any sort of pan-Iraqi nationalistic movement to offset the centrifugal forces within Iraq, how will the American version of the Iraqi government survive? It won't. I think the official introduction of Syria and Iran is admittance of that fact.

I don't know...how much longer should we hold out, hoping that some sort of nationalistic movement will bring peace? That does seem to be the question...

 

The Syrians, Joranians and Iranians have a degree of leverage on the Iraqi factions the US lack. That is because they have ties to Iraqi leaders who studied, worked or lived there in exile. Not to mention relatives. Their biggest advantage is that they are other Muslims and not outsiders. That alone gives them more legitimacy, and influence, than the US will have for the next decades. US influence in Iraq is simply the result of (a) them paying for the current government, and (b) of their troops in Iraq. And it ends there.
The reason why involving Syria and Iran is opposed is again the watering down of hard-line politics First: Talking with Syria and Iran would give them legitimicay at home, undermining the goal of regime change (which hasn't changed). Thus, they don't talk with them. That's why the 'negotiations' with Iran went through intermediaries like the EU3, Switzerland and Russia - and went nowhere. After all they are not about achieving an accord, but all about setting the conditions for regime change.
Second: They would have to make concessions (appeasement) . Iran and Syria both are unlikely to let slip the chance a US position of weakness offers. In Syria's case the price for their help would be pressure on Israel, very unlikely under Bush, and for Iran, no sanctions, even less likely. Concessions would be very much incompatible with Bush policy, so, it won't happen, for the same reason as before.

That they couldn't 'add legitimacy' is all but a pretext. With that in mind the refusal to negotiate with both from the hard-line camp is as predictable as logical. Bush will not negotiate with evil. If forced to negotiate with them, Bush will do it half-hearted and use the first best excuse to kill the process.